Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Wesley L. Larsen v. Exclusive Cars, Inc., a Utah
Corporation; Floyd Maestas, an individual : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Loren M. Lambert; Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Nick J. Colessides; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Larsen v. Exclusive Cars, No. 20010282 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3226

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WESLEY L. LARSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an
individual,

Utah Court of Appeals
CaseNo.200102#2-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

APPELLEES' OPPOSITION BRIEF

Appeal from Grant of Summary Judgment for Defendants/Appelleees
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 990408099(Lindberg)
Attorneys for Appellant:
LOREN M. LAMBERT (USBA #5101)
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah 84047
Tele: 801-568-0041

Attorneys for Appellees:
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696)
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: 801.521.4441; Fax: 801.521.4452

UtahCou.tcf Appoaio
MAR - 0 2002
Paulette Stags
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WESLEY L. LARSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an
individual,

Utah Court of Appeals
Case No. 20010272-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

APPELLEES' OPPOSITION BRIEF

Appeal from Grant of Summary Judgment for Defendants/Appelleees
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 990408099(Lindberg)
Attorneys for Appellant:
LOREN M. LAMBERT (USBA #5101)
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah 84047
Tele: 801-568-0041

Attorneys for Appellees:
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696)
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: 801.521.4441; Fax: 801.521.4452

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WESLEY L. LARSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC, a Utah
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an
individual,

Utah Court of Appeals
CaseNo.20010272-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), Defendants/Appellees Exclusive
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COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION
Appellant erroneously contends that this court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
as a pour-over case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). However, as set out below and in

Appellees'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

filed

simultaneously, there is no "final judgment," below and no exception to the final judgment
rule applies, so this court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUES & STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I
Does this court lack appellate jurisdiction other than to dismiss this appeal because
the trial court has not yet determined the amount of attorney feees to which Apellees are
entitled? Standard of Review: de novo. Pledgery. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, \ 16,982 P.2d 572.
ISSUE II
Can this court review a basis for attorney fees which the trial court has not yet
announced? Standard of Review: question of law, correctness. See Dejavue. Inc. v. U.S.
Energy Corp.. 1999 UT App 355, \ 8, 993 P.2d 222.
ISSUE III
Did the trial court have a proper basis for concluding that Appellees are entitled to
recover attorney fees and costs? Standard of Review: correctness. Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S.
Energy Corp.. 1999 UT App 355, \ 8, 993 P.2d 222.

1

ISSUE IV
Did the trial court correctly conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that
Appellant's reliance was unreasonable and Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law? Standard of Review: correctness. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d
967, 969 (Utah 1989).
ISSUE V
Are Appellees entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal? Standard of Review:
correctness. See Dejavue. Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp.. 1999 UT App 355, f 8, 993 P.2d 222.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant purchased a Toyota pickup from Appellees.1 For purposes of ruling on
Appellees' motion for summary judgment below, the trial court accepted Appellant's
contention that during the course of negotiations for the pickup, Mr. Maestas, one of
Appellees, told Appellant that the pickup had a new engine, which it did not. It appears that
in the course of a recall, something had been replaced in the engine, but not the whole engine
itself.2 However, Appellees provided, and Appellant signed, four (4) separate documents
showing: (1) that there were no warranties on the pickup, (2) that Appellant bore sole
responsibility for any repairs, (3) that the pickup was being sold "as is," and (4) that oral
promises were not binding on the dealer, including a handwritten statement that nothing else
was promised, either implicitly or implicitly. Moreover, Appellant also was told by his
brother-in-law to get in writing the representation that the pickup had a new engine, and
Appellant did not insist nor follow up on that suggestion.
The trial court ruled that in the face of these many "red flags" which Appellant chose
to disregard, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant's reliance was
unreasonable and that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1

. Since this matter is not properly before the Court of Appeals, there is no RECORD
below to which Appellees properly may refer. However, copies of relevant documents are
attached in the Addendum to this Brief and to the Addendum submitted by Appellant with
its Opening Brief.
2

. The pickup had been recalled and something indeed had been replaced in the
engine, but the whole engine itself had not been replaced. (Appellant's Deposition at
p.62).
3

The trial court entered summary judgment for Appellees and also ruled that Appellees
were entitled to attorney fees and costs. Appellees submitted their claim for attorney fees and
costs and Appellant objected both to Appellees' entitlement to such fees and costs, and to the
amount of the fees and costs requested by Appellees.
Before the trial court ruled on Appellant's objections, however, Appellant filed the
first of many Notices of Appeal in the matter. At that point, as indicated in a handwritten note
by the court below, the trial court erroneously understood that it had been deprived of
jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of Appellant's objections and Appellee's request
for attorney fees and costs. Opposition Brief Addendum Exhibit 1 (Trial Court Docket entry).
Without informing the trial court that the Utah Supreme Court in Promax
Development Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, ^ 15, 998 P.2d 254 had recently overturned prior
law under which the trial court was apparently laboring, Appellant pursued this premature
appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Since there is no final judgment and no exception to the final judgment rule applies,
this court has no appellate jurisdiction. Even if this court had jurisdiction, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment for Appellees. This court therefore should dismiss this
appeal, award attorney fees and costs to Appellees, and remand the case to the trial court for
determination of the amount of attorney fees and costs, both at trial, and on this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT HAS NOT YET DETERMINED THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY
FEES TO WHICH APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED
An appellate court is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction. Nafl Bank of Hailey,

Idaho v. Lewis, 13 Utah 507, 509, 45 P. 890, 891 (1896). Its determination whether it has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, If 16,
982 P.2d 572. This court's first duty, therefore, is to determine whether it has jurisdiction,
and if it concludes that it does not, then it must dismiss the action. Giles v. Oakridge Country
Club, 2001 UTApp 381,2001 WL 1549232, *1 (quoting Barney v. Division of Occupational
& Prof 1 Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 543-44 (Utah Ct.App.1992)).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that:
ff

a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party before
the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3."
Loffredo v. Holt. 2001 UT 97, f 12, 37 P.3d 1070 (quoting Promax Development Corp. v.
Raile. 2000 UT 4, % 15, 998 P.2d 254).
Appellant concedes that the trial court has not yet ruled on the amount of attorney fees
and costs to which Appellees are entitled. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p.7, f 23). None of
the three possible exceptions to the final judgment rule apply here, and Appellant does not

5

contend otherwise.3 Therefore this court has no jurisdiction and it must dismiss Appellant's
premature appeal.
Appellant was very well aware that the trial court labored under the misapprehension
that because Appellant filed this "appeal," the trial court had lost jurisdiction to determine
the amount of attorney fees and costs owed to Appellees. (Appellant's Opening Brief, Exh.
5, Affidavit of Frances M. Wyss, p.2, ^ 3). Instead of correcting the trial court's error by
alerting that court about the Utah Supreme Court's contrary holding in Loffredo v. Holt,
2001 UT 97, 37 P.3d 1070 and Promax Development Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d
254, Appellant simply filed this "appeal." Appellant cannot use the trial court's mistake to
fabricate appellate jurisdiction.
II.

THIS COURT CANNOT REVIEW A BASIS FOR ATTORNEY FEES WHICH
THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT YET ANNOUNCED
Even if this court had appellate jurisdiction, this court cannot review a decision the

trial court has not yet announced.
Appellant contends that there was no basis for the trial court's determination that

3

. First, none of the three requirements for certification pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) have been met. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767
(Utah 1984)(multiple claims or multiple parties; judgment appealed from entered on an
order appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action; trial
court determination that 'there is no just reason for delay'). Second, this court's
permission has not been obtained for interlocutory review under rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. UTAH R. APP. P. 5. Third, no statute otherwise permits this
appeal. Loffredo v. Holt 2001 UT 97, f 15, 37 P.3d 1070 (similarly dismissing appeal
where none of the three exceptions were present).
6

Appellees are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 17,
Point II). However, Appellant also asserts that the trial court has not yet considered or ruled
upon the proper basis for such entitlement. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-19, Point III)
This court cannot review a determination the trial court has not yet made. Accordingly, even
if there were appellate jurisdiction herein, this court cannot review a decision the trial court
has not yet made.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD A PROPER BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT
APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS
Even if this court had appellate jurisdiction, and even if the trial court had already

announced its basis and determined the amount of attorney fees and costs below, this court
would have to uphold such award.
The contract between the parties provides:
"In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions
or warranties in this agreement, purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees,
court costs and collection fees."
(Opposition Brief Addendum Exhibit 2, MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE, p.2, |
6)(Emphasis added).4
In Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, 38 P.3d 1001, this court affirmed an award of
attorney fees and costs based on a contractual provision allowing for fees and costs to the

4

. Since this matter is not properly before the Court of Appeals, there is no RECORD
below to which Appellees may refer. Accordingly, reference is made to Exhibits in the
ADDENDUM attached hereto.
7

prevailing party incurred in "litigation ... to enforce" the contract. Id. 2001 UT App at 404,
f 1. This court upheld the trial court's determination that a defense against rescission was
"litigation ... to enforce" the contract that entitled the party defending against the rescission
action to attorney fees and costs under the contractual provision. Ld. 2001 UT App 404, f 13.
This court reasoned that the successful defense against rescission preserved the contract, and
therefore "enforced" it. Ld. 2001 UT App 404, f 17. Appellees similarly successfully
preserved the contract against fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and therefore
also "enforced" it.
Other states have similarly held. In Siligo v. Castellucci, 21 Cal.App.4th 873, 26
Cal.Rptr.2d 439 (1994), the parties' contracts provided for recovery of attorney fees by a
prevailing party in an action "arising out o f or "to interpret or enforce" the contracts. The
seller sued the buyer for breach of contract, and the buyer cross-complained for fraud. The
seller prevailed at trial. However, the trial court awarded attorney fees to the seller only on
the seller's breach of contract claim against the buyer, but not on the defense against the
buyer's fraud claim against the seller.5 The Court of Appeals reversed, emphasizing that the
critical consideration is whether the defense against the noncontractual claim was necessary
to succeed on the contractual claim. Id., 21 Cal.App.4th at 879, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 443. The
buyer argued that its fraud cross-claim did not seek rescission or otherwise attack the

5

. It was possible for the trial court to so divide the award because the attorneys for
seller had submitted separate billings for prosecution of the seller's contract claim and for
defense against the buyer's fraud claim.
8

enforceability of the contracts, but sought only monetary damages independent of the validity
of the underlying agreements. In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals held:
"[Seller] was required to defend against fraud in order to succeed on his complaint to
enforce the agreements. The practical success of [Seller's] defense was the
enforceability of the agreements. The cost of litigating the issue raised by [Buyer]
therefore constituted part of the cost of enforcing the contracts. The trial court
therefore erred in apportioning its award of attorney's fees between the offensive and
defensive aspects of this case."
Id., 21 Cal.App.4th at 880, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 443.
Similarly, Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 28 P.3d 286 (Alaska 2001), involved a
defense against a suit to reform an easement. The court held that a defense against a suit for
reformation of an easement is similar to a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the
agreement is valid, and thus is an action "to enforce" the agreement, as provided in the
attorney fees provision involved. More broadly, the court emphasized that a suit "to enforce"
an agreement refers to a suit to confirm the validity of the terms of an agreement in the face
of a challenge. Under both conceptions, the court held that the successful defense of the
agreement entitled the prevailing party to attorney fees and costs. Id. 28 P.3d at 289.
The reasoning of the Siligo and Gamble cases is consistent with this court's decision
in Chase v. Scott and is applicable here. Appellant similarly attempted to circumvent the
parties' agreement through an action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Appellees'
successful defense of the agreement is indistinguishable from a Declaratory Judgment action
by Appellees seeking a declaration that the agreement was enforceable according to its terms.
If Appellees had brought such an action and if Appellant similarly had counterclaimed for
9

fraud and negligent misrepresentation, Appellees' success against Appellant's counterclaims
would have been necessary to succeed on Appellees' declaratory claim. More broadly,
Appellees' successful defense against Appellant's fraud and negligence claims here
confirmed the validity of the agreement. Such defense, therefore, constituted an action "to
enforce" it, entitling Appellees to recover attorney fees and costs below.
Policy support also maybe drawn from the Utah Supreme Court's decisions regarding
the award of attorney fees and costs on successful appeals to parties who recover attorney
fees as prevailing parties at the trial court level. The purpose of a contractual provision for
attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party against the necessity of paying an attorney's
fee and to enable the party to recover the full amount of the contractual obligation.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah
1980)(party awarded attorney fees and costs in trial court is entitled to such fees and costs
on appeal as matter of law). If a party who successfully recovers attorney fees and costs
pursuant to a contractual provision for such fees and costs is required to defend its position
on appeal at its own expense, its rights under the contract are thereby diminished. For that
reason, the court in Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates held as a matter
of law that "a provision for payment of attorney fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract..." Id. (overruling prior cases).
Similarly, since it is indisputable that Appellees would recover attorney fees and costs

10

pursuant to the contractual provision for actions "to enforce" the contract, they should not
be required to pay for their own attorney fees and costs to defend against Appellant's fraud
and negligence claims seeking to negate provisions in the contract, because to do so would
thereby diminish Appellees' rights under the contract. As a matter of law, Appellees had a
right to recover attorney fees and costs by successfully defending against Appellant's fraud
and negligence claims.
IV.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
APPELLANT'S RELIANCE WAS UNREASONABLE AND APPELLEES ARE
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Even if this court had appellate jurisdiction, and even if the trial court had already

announced its basis and determined the amount of attorney fees and costs below, this court
still would uphold the trial court's summary judgment for Appellees.
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when (a) there is no genuine issue
of material fact and (b) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH
R.ClV.P. 56(c). On appeal, the facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the losing
party. Briggs v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
The scope of Appellant's purported appeal is fairly narrow. First, it only concerns one
single fraud claim. Initially, Appellant asserted two causes of action in the trial court: fraud
and negligent misrepresentation. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p.4, ^f 8). Now Appellant
concedes that its claim for negligent misrepresentation was not well taken, and has
abandoned that claim on appeal. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p.3)(..."Plaintiff... conceded

11

that his claim for negligent misrepresentation was not well taken and does not appeal the
dismissal of this cause of action.").
Second, this purported appeal only involves one single element of Appellant's fraud
claim. In Utah, all of the following elements of fraud must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence; (1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he or she had insufficient knowledge on which to base such representation; (5)
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his or her injury and damage. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246
(Utah 1980).
In both its Memorandum Decision and in its Judgment, the trial court concluded that
there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the element of reasonable reliance.

See Trial Court DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMARY JUDGMENT

(Opposition Brief Addendum Exhibit 3); Trial Court JUDGMENT (Opposition Brief
Addendum Exhibit 4).6
If there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any one of the elements
of fraud, then summary judgment against Appellant was appropriate at the trial level and

6

. Appellant erroneously contends that the trial court held that there was no genuine
issue with respect to both "(1) reasonable reliance" and "(2) intent to defraud."
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p.3).
12

must be upheld on appeal. See, e.g., Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446,450 (Utah Ct. App.
1996)(since buyers knew seller could not convey certain lot, buyers could not establish that
they acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of sellers1 earlier representations about
the lot, so sellers were entitled to summaryjudgment as a matter of law). Appellant does not
seem to seriously contend otherwise, but instead attacks the trial court's conclusion that there
was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the element of reasonable reliance.
The trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
Appellant's reliance was unreasonable. The trial court accepted as true Appellant's version

of the facts. Trial Court

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMARY

JUDGMENT, p. 1 (Opposition Brief Addendum Exhibit 3). The trial court accepted each of the

following as true:
1. That Appellant bought a vehicle from Appellees, that Mr. Maestas, one of the
Appellees, orally represented to Appellant that the vehicle had a new motor, and that
the vehicle did not have a new motor.

Trial Court DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMARY JUDGMENT, p.2
(Opposition Brief Addendum Exhibit 3).
2. That Appellant received and signed 4 separate documents as follows:
"(a) [the] "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale,' which clearly stated that there
were no express or implied warranties on any used vehicles; (b) a waiver of
benefits statement declining the offer to purchase an extended warranty plan,
and acknowledging that [Appellant] bore 'sole responsibility' for any repairs;
(c) a document entitled 'Buyers' Guide' (also referenced in the vehicle
Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle window and which stated
13

'AS IS-NO WARRANTY'" and which also indicated that no systems were
covered by any warranty; and (d) a 'DUE BILL' which in capital letters
indicated 'ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE DEALER!5
along with a handwritten statement below that stating 'Nothing else promised,
implied, or expressed.5"
Id.
3, And that,
"[Appellant] had been advised by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the
deal) to secure written documentation of [Appellees5] representation, [that
Appellant] made a single request which was not directly responded to ... [and
that to] the extent that [Appellant's ] request yielded some information (i.e.,
the name of the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), [Appellant]
then failed to follow-up on the information he was provided orally."
Id.
Under these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded:
"[Appellant] here was provided not one, but many, 'red flags' which he chose to
disregard. Having done so, he must deal with the 'consequences of his own neglect."5
Id.
In Gold Standard Inc. v. Getty Oil 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996), the court held
that "[w]hile the question of reasonable reliance is usually a matter within the province of
the jury... there are instances where courts may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was
no reasonable reliance." Paraphrasing Gold Standard, the trial court below concluded:
'"Under the law of [Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the
opposing party in light of contrary written information. No matter how naive or
inexperienced [Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept
unquestioningly any representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such
investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstance would dictate.'
Gold Standard. 915 P.2dat 1068 (citingRubev v. Wood. 373 P.2d386,387-88 (Utah
14

1962)). 'The one who complains of being injured b y . . . false representation cannot
heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising such
degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own
neglect.5 Gold Standard, at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d
124 (Utah 1982))."

M.
Appellant does not disagree that if the trial court properly concluded that there was
no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant's reliance was unreasonable, then Appellees
were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Instead, Appellant contends that the
trial court "misapplied" the Gold Standard case. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12.)
The trial court carefully and correctly applied the Gold Standard case. In the first
place, the trial court correctly interpreted that case as authorizing trial courts to determine on
summary judgment that there is no genuine issue of material fact that a plaintiffs reliance
is unreasonable. The trial court here properly did so in light of the undisputed facts. No
reasonable trier of fact could conclude, in light of the undisputed facts, that Appellant had
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant reasonably relied on an oral
representation in the face of the four documents to the contrary. Moreover, Appellant even
failed to follow up on a suggestion by his brother-in-law that Appellant confirm in writing
that the used vehicle in question did indeed have a new engine. (See Exhibit 3 hereto).
Second, Appellant's attempt to distinguish Gold Standard as inapplicable to nineteenyear-old high school graduates is ineffectual.(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10.) The
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fundamental principle of Gold Standard is that every person must act reasonably in the
marketplace. Even nineteen-year-olds such as Appellant, whom the law empowers to enter
into enforceable contracts,7 must act reasonably. It was unreasonable for Appellant to rely
on the representation that the used pickup he was buying had a new engine. This is
particularly so where in this case, four separate documents received and signed by Appellant
told him that oral representations were not binding on the dealer, that the vehicle was sold
"as is," and that there were no warranties express or implied. Even his brother-in-law told
him to "get it in writing," and still, Appellant failed to follow up on that suggestion.
Appellant asked the trial court, in essence, to avoid his contract and save him from his own
unreasonable behavior. Such a standard as Appellant suggests would lead sellers and other
actors in the marketplace to avoid selling to nineteen-year-olds. That would disadvantage
them in the marketplace, leading sellers to charge them higher prices in light of the additional
risk that such nineteen-year-olds might disaffirm such contracts. The legislature wisely has
limited such disaffirmance to eighteen-year-olds, and this court should not re-write the
statutes.8
Third, Appellant's reliance on Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc.. 2000 UT App
200, 2 P.3d 219 is similarly misplaced. In Robinson, the defendant seller not only told the

7

. In Utah, a person eighteen years of age or older has the legal capacity to
contract. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-2-1, 15-2-2. Appellant herein was nineteen years of
age when he bought the vehicle involved.
8

. Id. (only contracts entered into prior to 18-year-old majority can be disaffirmed).
16

buyer that the building in question had no structural defects, but the seller backed up that
representation with "an inspection report that failed to note any structural problems with the
building." Id. 2000 UT App at f 21. In contrast, Appellant's oral statement that the vehicle
in question had a new engine was not followed up with any writing. On the contrary, all four
of the subsequent writings provided to and signed by Appellant provided that the vehicle was
being sold "as is" and that the seller disavowed any oral representations regarding the
vehicle. Moreover, Appellant subsequently was told by his brother-in-law to get the newmotor assurance in writing, and Appellant failed to follow up on that suggestion. Therefore,
in contrast to the Robinson plaintiff, Appellant herein was given no writing confirming an
oral misrepresentation, but instead was provided with writings negating such representation,
and Appellant also was advised by his own relative to obtain a written assurance and failed
to do so.
Fourth, Semenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578 (Utah 1999), also cited by Appellant, is
unhelpful to Appellant's cause. The plaintiff in Semenov asserted a language deficiency;
Appellant here does not. Semenov does not apply to "unsophisticated nineteen-year-olds."
If it did, then all contracts by nineteen-year-olds would be suspect, since every dissatisfied
nineteen-year-old would argue lack of sophistication in order to avoid contractual provisions,
or as in this case, to contend that they acted reasonably in the face of 4 separate documents
plus the advice of their own brother-in-law to the contrary.
In summary, the trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of
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material fact that appellant's reliance was unreasonable and that appellees were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
V.

APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL
Since Appellees are the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees and costs in the trial

court below, Appellees also are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal as a
matter of law. Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App 232,f 39, 30 P.3d 436 (quoting Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)); Management Services Corp. v. Development
Associates. 617 P.2d 406,408-09 (Utah 1980)(party awarded attorney fees and costs in trial
court is entitled to such fees and costs on appeal as matter of law).
CONCLUSION
This court should remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine the
attorney fees and costs to which Appellees are entitled both for proceedings below and on
appeal.

/

DATED this^L. day of March 2002.

NICK JyCOLESSIDES
Attorney for Appellees
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CASE NUMBER 990408099 Debt Collection
20010282-CA.
/%)>
stept
08-01-01 Filed: VERIFIED^DBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS FEES
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08-24-01 Note: AT THE REQUEST OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, FILE WAS
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EXHIBIT 2

MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE
WK9 L LAESCN

EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.
5720 SOUTH STATE
MURRAY, UT 84107
(801) 268-9909

PURCHASER'S NAME

M15 S 33 70 E
VSLC,

UT M)

i ' ' 0 1 !r2Ji
DATE OF SALE

STREET ADORESS

09
< f l f l UbUS9 PRONE
^ 9 - * * "MB

^"pASfc^

Purchaser and Co-Purchasers). If any, (hereafter referred to as "Purchaser**) hereby agree to purchase the following vehicle from Seller/ Dealer (hereafter referred to as "Seller"), subject to
all terms, conditions, warranties and agreements contained herein, including those printed on the reverse side hereof
NEW

USED D E M O

YEAR

F?< •• 4 V 4

TOYOTA^

1991

SALESPERSON

TTAVMnr^H^fl^flyq

Q4 ?£-,-?

riwv

•

rur

Title (if not, explain)

-H-fcz

2 ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS

n ,i»

THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-IN

PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE
1. CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE

rvQ4.i^'

PROPERTY
TAX

ODOMETER
STATEMENT

AUTHORIZATION
FOR PAYOFF

NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES
6 TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5)
7. MFR. REBATE

1 1 (71??

The information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide) for this vehicle is part of this contract
Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract of sale
I HAVE FJEQEIVED A^COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE

?fl

JUA-

8. PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE
9 SUBTOTAL

tew*^ f*

JLLL-

(line 6 minus 8)

n ft? ,>,??.
TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS

FINANCING DISCLOSURE
INSTRUCTION One of the two following disclosures, either "A* or "B", must be acknowledged If
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing, or if this is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-in only
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A" If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then both
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "B" BY SIGNING. PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE " B " , DO
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN.

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
•BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN:

0,00

BALANCE OWED TO:
ADDRESS:

PAYOFF
VERIFIED BY:

^ - ^

" ( A ) " THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES, WARRANTIES,
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLER'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE FURTHERMORE, PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PURCHASER Jf
_

GOOD
UNTIL:

^C^SER^

I W

' W ^ ~

SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING

DATE OF
VERIFICATION:,

ACC. #:

•WARRANTY A £ TO BALANCE OWED ON TRADED-IN VEHICLE:
Purchaser warrants that he/she has given Seller a true pay-off amount on any
vehicle traded in, and that if it is not correct and is greater than the amount shown
above, Purchaser will pay the excess to Seder on demand

" ( B ) " THE-PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION THAT
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR
VEHICLE THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN 1 4 , 2
% AND14.2
% PER ANNUM. TERM BETWEEN

10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE

fl.flfl

11. BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN*

0.ftfl

BETWEEN # 2 5 1 1

0,00

ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $

12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN

(line 10 minus 11)

13. DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit ami, line 8)
14. TOTAL CREOITS

(total lines 12 & 13)

15. SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9

18. SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS

(total lines 15-17)
0.00

20. NET TAXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 minus line 19)

11022.28

21. UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON ^AXABLETAMOWr
22. LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES
23. PROPERTY TAX DUE ON TRADE-IN
25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE
26. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX
28

(lines 18, 21-27)
(line 14)

30. TOTAL CREDITS

31 BALANCE DUE
12

)tal line 29 minus 30)

19.
DAY-?
MONTH.
Purchaser has arranged insurance on vehicle through .

U 0 3 2 , 7B

IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER, INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY
—( MPJOfl VEHICLE TRADED IN IF THE TRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF
6 . 9 9 * 9 1 ^KBEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION, THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN
" L W - T H E PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE
31.50
•** PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRADE-IN, AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE
—ISIGfliING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN
^ T F tFINANCING
NAI

0,00
379.00

27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE

PER MONTH BASED

2500. 00

HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT, IF HE/SHE CHOOSES, TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OF SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE, THE PURCHASER SHALL
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED,
(2) PAYTHE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN, ANO
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE

AM
35, 00,
0,0fl

24. STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST

MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS

PER MONTH AND $ ^ 5 . , 1

IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED, THEN
ILLER MUST, WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE, MAIL NOTICE TO THE

00

0.<d0

19. TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10)

MONTHS AND _ £ 0

l
( ?mMtHi{i
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN

11023.28

16. SERVICE CONTRACT
17.

29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE

?^00

60

4,Vw

SIGNATURE
OF PURCHASEI

I^WJUJK

f-4r-

J£

12067. 69 H O J H E R TERMS AGREED TO:
^

?3fl0.00 '

" " S TO ARRANGE
BY

L

.^~

=£

NONEQ

AS FOLLOWS^

FINANONft

3 2-00-98

9567.69
. insurance company Policy # ,

Asls stated on the reverse side of this document, unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing, Seller makes no Warranty, express or implied, with respect to the merchantability,
fitness for particular purpose, or otherwise concerning the vehicle, parts or accessories described herein Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that provided by the
manufacturer, if any, as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof
Purchaser agrees that,this contract includes all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as oi
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HJS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANO FURTHER AGREES TO PAY THE "BALANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED
SIGNATURE

_±

CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which
have been mutually agreed upon:
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except
as otherwise noted on the reverse side hereof.
2. If the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller
may set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicle
has been taken in trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out
of the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete
the purchase.
3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond
the control of the Seller.
4.

NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER,
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS,
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.

5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said used vehicle.
6.

In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement,
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees.

7.

Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing.

8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS
AGREEMENT.
9.

Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older.

10.

Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security interest in the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to
secure full payment of the purchase price. This security interest covers all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also grants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage insurance policy
on the vehicle.

11.

If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this
vehicle is part of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in this contract of sale.

12.

IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS:
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT,
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE:
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF;
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCURATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN;
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE, AND THAT
TRANSFER OF THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS
RIGHTFUL; AND
(e) THAT THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED",
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-1a-1004 AND 41 -1a-1005
OR STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT. IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FOR AND PAY THE SELLER THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE AND THE REDUCED
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISTRATION.

13.

Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by Purchaser for the purpose of securing Seller,
against losses proximately caused by Purchaser's breach, if any, of the warranties made in the preceding paragraph.

14. Any written notice required to be given Purchaser if mailed by ordinary mail, postage prepaid, to Purchaser's mailing address
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deemed reasonable and effective notification.
15. The rate of interest as set forth in the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may involve a variable rate, if therein
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit agreement representing financing to provide the credit disclosures required by law,
including disclosures regarding variable rates of interest.

EXHIBIT 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

WESLEY L.LARSEN,
Plaint^

vs.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a
Utah corporation, and FLOYD
MAESTAS,
Defendants.

]
1
\
]
])
;

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civ. No. 990408099

Defendants have moved this Court for Summary Judgment and filed a Memorandum of Law in
support of their motion. Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have replied to Plaintiffs
opposition. Defendants have requested oral argument. However, after reviewing the parties'
submissions and applicable case law, ft is the Court's view that ttedispoative issue govaiiing the
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. Accordingly, oral argument is
not necessary.
Plaintiffs complaint alleged bothfraudulentand negligent misrepresentation. In Ms opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summaiy Judgment, however, Plaintiff conceded that under the authority
of Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 U t App. 200, his claim for negligent misrepresentation "must
fail." Consequently the only issues for the Court are whether (1) there are material issues of fact
that preclude summaiy judgment on thefraudulentmisrepresentation claim, or (2) if no material
issues of fact are in dispute, whether Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Ov. P. 56.
Plaintiff has agreed with Defendants* statement of undisputed facts. In his opposition, however,
Plaintiff raises additional factual statements, some of which (paragraphs 1-3) are accepted without
dispute by Defendants, others of which (paragraphs 4*8) are disputed in whole or in part by
Defendants. The Court hereby incorporates by reference all the undisputed facts noted in
Defendants' and Plaintiffs memoranda. Furthermore, for purposes of ruling on this motion the
Court accepts as true Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts. Notwithstanding this assumption,
the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants must prevail.
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action (forfraudulentmisrepresentation) requires that Plaintiff
establish the following elements: (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact, (3) which was false, and (4) which the representor either knew to be false,
or made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did, in fact, rely upon it, (8) and was

thereby induced to act, (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold Standard Inc.. v. Getty Oil
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). This Court is mindful that "[wjhile the question of reasonable
reliance is usually a matter within the province of the jury . . . there are instances where courts
may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." IdL The Court holds as
a matter of law that, on the facts of this case, it was not reasonable for Plaintiff to act as he did.
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas,in fact, represented that the vehicle Plaintiff
was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on
that representation without taking independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written
documents. Plaintiff claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding
4 separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale,"
which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on any used vehicles; (b) a
waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to purchase an extended warranty plan, and
acknowledging that he bore "sole responsibility" for any repairs; (c) a document entitled "Buyer's
Guide" (also referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated that no systems
were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in capital letters indicated "ORAL
PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement
below that stating "Nothing else promised, implied, or expressed." Moreover, although Plaintiff
had been advised by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which was not directly
responded to. To the extent that Plaintiffs request yielded some information (i.e., the name of
the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), Plaintiff then failed to follow-up on the
information he was provided orally.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively resolves the question
of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of [Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely
upon oral statements by the opposing party in light of contrary written information. No matter
how naive or inexperienced [Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept
unquestioningly any representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation
and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard. 915 P 2d
at 1068 (citing Rubevv.Wood. 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). "The one who complains of
being injured by . . . false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but
has the duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." Gold
Standard, at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)).
Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags" which he chose to disregard. Having
done so, he must deal with the "consequences of his own neglect."
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTEI^^^^^^Ws disposition, the trial
/CX
dates are stricken. So ordered.
Dated this 21st day of February, 2001.
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EXHIBIT 4

FILST
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SANDY DEPT.

NICK J. COLESSIDES (969)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325

Tele: 801.521-4441

5A/~-rf*S$%*

Attorney for Defendants
Exclusive Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY L. LARSEN

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah
corporation, and FLOYD
MAESTAS,
:

Case No.:

99 04 08099

:

Judge: Denise P. Lindberg

Defendants.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment having come
regularly for consideration and decision before the Honorable
Denise P. Lindberg, and the Court having received the submissions
of the parties, to-wit: Memoranda and attached exhibits thereto
in support of each party's respective position, and the Court
having considered the submission of the parties, and the Court
having made and entered its Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, which decision, order, and findings,

are incorporated herein by this reference, and the Court having
found that plaintiff Wesley L. Larsen did not act reasonably in
relying upon the oral representations of defendant Floyd Maestas,
despite having been provided with many red flags and ignoring the
same, and plaintiff failing to follow up in an inquiry to
determine the veracity of the information orally presented by
defendant Maestas, and plaintiff having received from the
defendant dealer four separate and distinct documents disclaiming
any oral representations, and the Court having entered its order
granting defendants their motion for summary judgment,

and good

cause otherwise appearing therefor, now therefore, upon the
motion of Nick J. Colessides, attorney for defendants Exclusive
Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no
cause of action, and that defendants are hereby entitled to and
shall recover money judgment against plaintiff for defendants'
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with
the defense of this matter, the same to be presented to the Court
by an affidavit of defendants' counsel, and for augmentation of
costs and attorney's fees for the collection of the judgment.

2

SO ORDERED.
Dated this

day of

[AJ(0JiA , 2001
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